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Abstract According to the ‘Description–Experience gap’ (DE gap), when people are
provided with the descriptions of risky prospects they make choices as if they over-
weight the probability of rare events; but when making decisions from experience
after exploring the prospects’ properties, they behave as if they underweight such
probability. This study revisits this discrepancy while focusing on information-search
in decisions from experience. We report findings from a lab-experiment with three
treatments: a standard version of decisions from description and two versions of deci-
sions from experience: with and without a ‘history table’ recording previously sampled
events. We find that people sample more from lotteries with rarer events. The history
table proved influential; in its absence search is more responsive to cues such as a
lottery’s variance while in its presence the cue that stands out is the table’s maximum
capacity. Our analysis of risky choices captures a significant DE gap which is mitigated
by the presence of the history table. We elicit probability weighting functions at the
individual level and report that subjects overweight rare events in experience but less
so than in description. Finally, we report a measure that allows us to compare the type
of DE gap found in studies using choice patterns with that inferred through valuation
and find that the phenomenon is similar but not identical across the two methods.
Keywords Decisions from experience · Decisions from description · Risk
preferences · Cumulative prospect theory · Uncertainty · Source method · Information
search
B Orestis Kopsacheilis
orestiskopsacheilis@gmail.com
1 School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Sir Clive Granger Building,
Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
123
O. Kopsacheilis
1 Introduction
Uncertainty pervades almost every sphere of economic activity and understanding and
predicting the choices people make under uncertain circumstances has been a central
goal for decision theorists. Among the plethora of theories of risky behaviour, Cumu-
lative Prospect Theory (henceforth CPT; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) has emerged
as the descriptive benchmark for laboratory experiments where lotteries’ properties
(list of all possible outcomes and associated probabilities) are fully described (Barberis
2013). One of its key tenets is the claim that people tend to overweight low probability
events. However, outside of the laboratory people do not often have access to such
explicit numerical summaries of uncertainty.
To study more naturalistic situations, psychologists have recently revived the con-
cept of ‘Decisions From Experience’ (DFE). Within this programme, the ‘sampling
paradigm’ (Hertwig et al. 2004) has emerged as the most common lab-implementation
of DFE. Unlike ‘Decisions From Description’ (DFD) where the properties of lotteries
are explicitly described, subjects in DFE have to explore risky options by sampling
from their content (in a computerised setting) prior to making a decision. On each
screen, there are typically two such options, each with up to two different possible
outcomes. Subjects can experience these outcomes and their relative frequency by
clicking on each option. Sampling helps subjects decide which option they want to
draw from in a final trial involving real monetary consequences. Unlike this final
trial, none of the draws during sampling has any monetary effect. Comparing choices
between DFD and DFE, a consistent discrepancy has emerged: in DFD—and in accord
with CPT’s tenets—people make choices as if they overweight rare1 events; whereas,
in DFE, it is as if they underweight such events (Hertwig et al. 2004).
Several studies (e.g. Hau et al. 2008; Ungemach et al. 2009) have since replicated
and explored the underpinnings of the ‘Description–Experience gap’ (DE gap), offer-
ing both a wealth of insights and some important open questions (see de Palma et al.
2014 for a recent review). In this study, we address some of those questions by con-
ducting a laboratory experiment with three treatments: a standard version of DFD and
two variations of DFE. Our contribution to this literature is threefold.
First, we look at sampling patterns in DFE. One of the earliest and most robust
findings is that subjects typically rely on small samples where rare events tend to be
under-represent (Hertwig 2012). We investigate how people adjust their search strategy
as a function of the rarity of an event by looking at the correlation of sampling amount
and a lottery’s variance: low variance lotteries in our context contain rarer events.
Lejarraga et al. (2012) study a similar concept, that of “experienced outcome vari-
ability” which occurs when a subject samples more than one outcome from a given
option. The authors find that this variability correlates with higher levels of sampling
and conclude that people are motivated to sample more from lotteries for which they
have experienced more than one outcome. Mehlhorn et al. (2014), however, question
the direction of this causality by pointing to an endogeneity concern: the likelihood
of observing more than one outcome increases with the sampling amount. It is, there-
1 It is a convention within this literature to refer to events occurring with p ≤ 0.20 as ‘rare’.
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fore, possible that high levels of sampling are causing subjects to experience more
than one outcome rather than the other way around and conclude that the driver of
search effort is ‘anticipated’ rather than ‘experienced’ outcome variability. Studying
the relationship between sampling amount and variance contributes to this dialogue in
the following way. First, variance is a structural property of the lottery and, therefore,
unlike experienced variability, remains unaffected by sampling amount. Moreover,
high variance causes variability: a subject is more likely to experience more than one
outcome from a ‘50–50’ rather than from a ‘99–1’ distribution. Therefore, if Lejarraga
et al.’s thesis holds true, we would expect search effort to correlate positively both with
experienced outcome variability and with variance. If, however, sampling amount is
positively correlated with variability but negatively correlated with variance, the evi-
dence would favour Melhorn et al.’s objection. Given the relation of variance with rare
events, this is equivalent to asking whether subjects sample more from lotteries with
rarer events.
Another key novelty of our design is the introduction of a history table in one of
our DFE variations: DFE-HT. This table records sampled events and displays them to
subjects when they later evaluate the lottery. We examine how its presence influences
search by comparing DFE-HT with a more standard version of DFE, DFE-NoHT
where there is no such record.2 One of the reasons we include this table relates to
the role of memory constraints. If subjects rely significantly on memorisation during
sampling then the history table will help them alleviate part of the associated cognitive
load. If this is the case, we would expect to observe larger samples in DFE-HT than
in DFE-NoHT. Because the role of memory is elusive to pinpoint (Wulff et al. 2016)
we tackle it from two additional angles: by including a test of working memory and
by examining whether sampling undertaken just before the moment of decision has
more impact than sampling undertaken earlier (‘recency effect’).
Second, we search for potential differences on revealed preferences between these
three ways of acquiring information: from description and from autonomous sampling
with or without a history table. We record these preferences via a method of repeated
choices between a risky and a safe option (see bisection method under 2.1). By com-
paring choice patterns across these three treatments we examine whether there is a DE
gap in our data and if so, whether it is amplified or mitigated by the presence of the
history table. Moreover, we elicit CPT’s components (in the gains domain only) at the
individual level. For this we rely on the methodology introduced by Abdellaoui et al.
(2011b), henceforth AHP, who recently applied the ‘source method’ (Tversky and
Fox 1995; Abdellaoui et al. 2011a, b) to study this gap. This method maps different
sources of uncertainty (such as DFD and DFE) onto distinct probability weighting
functions (weighting functions for short). By examining the shape of the elicited
aggregate weighting functions we revisit an interesting tension in this literature: if
subjects really underweight in DFE then CPT would prescribe a S-shaped weighting
function as opposed to the standard inverse S-shaped curve assigned to DFD. We refer
2 Hau et al. (2009) use a similar recording device but in their “decisions from records” treatment subjects
were only allowed to sample a fixed amount of cards and hence its influence to search cannot be inferred.
In our framework subjects can choose instead how much they want to sample.
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to this potential contrast between the weighting functions in DFD and DFE as the
‘underweighting hypothesis’.
Recent papers were unsuccessful in validating this pattern. AHP for example report
that CPT’s standard inverse S-shaped weighting function fits both DFD and DFE well
and find that the aggregate weighting function in DFE lies systematically below the
function elicited in DFD. They attribute this pattern to a reduced willingness to bet
in DFE which is induced by ambiguity aversion: subjects in DFE are less confident
about the properties of the sampled options than subjects in DFD. We will refer to this
pattern of the DE gap where both weighting functions are inverse-S shaped but that
of DFE lies beneath that of DFD as the ‘ambiguity aversion hypothesis’.
An attractive feature of AHP’s methodology is that it allows the elicitation of
decision weighting functions at the individual level both parametrically and non para-
metrically. Additionally, this elicitation permits the manipulation of the degree and
precision of the elicited curve. We follow this method and address the tension between
the two hypotheses regarding the shape of weighting curves. Suspecting that rare
events may hold the key to this investigation, we build on AHP’s method by eliciting
significantly more observations in the neighbourhood of rare events.
Third, we address an important methodological question that derives from AHP’s
adaptations of the sampling paradigm. There are four noticeable differences between
the two approaches. First, if an event is never experienced in the sampling paradigm
the subject is likely to remain ignorant about its existence. This is not the case
with the AHP method where the list of outcomes is always eventually presented to
the subject. Second, in the sampling paradigm sampled events reveal correspond-
ing pecuniary outcomes. In contrast, sampled events are represented by different
pairs of colours in the AHP method which are only later associated with mone-
tary outcomes. Third, in the sampling paradigm subjects sample from two options
at a time while in AHP only from one. Fourth and perhaps most importantly, there
is a sharp distinction between the ways the two methods infer the DE gap. In
the sampling paradigm this is done by comparing frequencies with which riskier
options are chosen over safer ones between DFD and DFE. This comparison does
not need to assume a preference model. In contrast, AHP elicit certainty equiv-
alents (CEs), which are prices that make subjects indifferent between keeping or
trading the lottery being evaluated. CEs are then used to estimate CPT’s weighting
functions and the DE gap is inferred by comparing their shape between DFD and
DFE.
These differences raise the question of whether the sampling paradigm’s DE gap
is qualitatively similar to that reported by AHP or perhaps a different phenomenon
altogether. We take a first step in answering this question by identifying the key DE
gap properties inferred through choice proportion comparisons. We then examine how
well these properties replicate under our valuation framework which is similar to the
one AHP used to infer the DE gap in weighting. We do so by exploiting a feature
of AHP’s implementation of the bisection method: a hybrid between valuation and
choice methods that elicits CEs by repeated choices between a risky and a safe option.
In what follows, Sect. 2 describes in detail our experimental and elicitation methods.
Section 3 presents the ensuing results and Sect. 4 discusses their implications. Finally
Sect. 5 concludes.
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Fig. 1 Sampling stage. Screen before (left) and after (right) a card is drawn. After drawing a card and
seeing its colour, subjects can replace it in the deck where it gets re-shuffled. They can repeat this for as long
as they want. This sampling process is identical in DFE-NoHT and DFE-HT and it appears on a separate
screen from the evaluation part. Unlike most sampling technologies, there was no time delay between two
consecutive draws. Subjects regulate the time the card remains on screen by pressing on the ‘replace’ and
‘sample’ buttons at their own discretion
2 Methods
2.1 Experimental design
We conduct a laboratory experiment with three treatments using a between-subjects
protocol.3 These treatments are: a standard version of DFD and two variations of DFE,
DFE-NoHT and DFE-HT.
Treatments consist of 19 time periods and in each period subjects evaluate a lottery.
These lotteries are represented by virtual decks of cards, each containing two types of
cards demarcated by different pairs of colours. In each period subjects first learn about
the relative frequency of each colour. These colours are then linked with monetary
outcomes and subjects are asked to evaluate the corresponding lottery.
The key difference between DFD and the two DFE treatments lies in the way
subjects learn about these relative frequencies. In DFD subjects are informed via
numerical descriptions, framed as one shot probabilities (E.g. ‘90% of the cards are
blue and 10% are red’; see Appendix 6.1 for an instance of this). In contrast, both
DFE-treatments require that subjects find out about these likelihoods by sampling
colours from the content of the deck in a separate sampling stage (Fig. 1).
The first 7 periods correspond to lotteries with the same probability distribution
(but differing outcomes). To communicate this, subjects in DFE go through only one
sampling stage, linked to 7 evaluation parts. Therefore, there were only 13 sampling
stages in total in DFE. Lotteries and colour-pairs are randomized for each subject
across periods. The first 7 lotteries are randomized only within that first cluster.
The only difference between the two DFE treatments is the presence (or absence) of
the history table during the evaluation part. After subjects in DFE-HT finish sampling
and proceed to the next screen associated with the evaluation part, they see a table that
has recorded the colours of cards they encountered during sampling, in the order they
saw them (see Fig. 2). This history table could only record up to a fixed number of
cards. When during sampling this capacity was reached, a message appeared on screen
informing subjects that they can continue sampling should they want to, but that their
observations past this point would not be recorded. We chose a maximum capacity of
3 This is a difference with AHP’s study which uses a within-subjects design where subjects always made
description-based decisions prior to experience-based ones.
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Fig. 2 Evaluation part in DFE-HT. Sampled events from the sampling stage are recorded and dispayed on
the top of the evaluation screen in DFE-HT. This part of the screen remained blank in DFE-NoHT
57 with the intention of avoiding a straight-forward calculation of a relative frequency
in numeric form, resembling the information in DFD.
The evaluation protocol is common for all three treatments. In this section events
(such as ‘Drawing a yellow card’) are associated with monetary consequences. We
use the bisection method as applied by AHP to elicit CEs for each lottery. An instance
of this can be seen at the bottom of Fig. 2. Every bisection process starts with a choice
between a lottery and its expected value offered with certainty. Lotteries are presented
under Option A while certain amounts under Option B. The method proceeds by
updating Option B until a value close to indifference is reached. In our experiment
there were 5 such iterations for each lottery. In Fig. 2’s example, if the subject chooses
Option B then the certain outcome will be updated to £9, the midpoint between the
lowest outcome of the lottery and the certain outcome that was just chosen. If instead
Option A is selected, then Option B will be updated to £13, the midpoint between the
highest outcome of the lottery and the certain outcome that was just rejected.
This elicitation through iterative one-shot choices makes the bisection robust against
the criticism that methods such as the multiple price list have received (see Erev et al.
2008 for such a criticism). Most importantly for our analysis is the fact that the very
first choice in each new evaluation is always between a lottery and a monetary outcome
of equivalent expected value (EV) offered with certainty. This is much like the setup
that studies in the sampling paradigm have used to infer the DE gap in choice.
Finally, after all lotteries are evaluated, subjects go through a standard forward
digit span task where they are asked to recall sequences of digits. Reporting cor-
rectly a digit awards the participant a point4 and increases the sequence by one digit.
After three errors the process is terminated. We use this task as a proxy for memory
capacity.
Sessions were conducted in CeDEx’s laboratory at the University of Nottingham.
All treatments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). In total, 118 subjects
took part in only one of these three treatments: 40 in DFE-HT, 39 DFE-NoHT and 39
in DFD. We used ORSEE (Greiner 2004) for the recruitment process. At the end of
the experiment one question was randomly selected and each subject would get paid
according to their choice in that question. Average payment was £11, including a £3
participation fee, for approximately 1-h sessions.
4 This task was not monetarily incentivised.
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2.2 Elicitation of CPT in DFD and DFE
2.2.1 Preliminaries
Let xEp y stand for a binary lottery where x, y are non-negative outcomes5 contin-
gent on mutually exclusive events and x > y. Ep represents an event occuring with
objective probability p and the high (or desirable) outcome x is always contingent to
Ep. According to CPT, given a strictly increasing utility function: u and a weighting
function W , subjects maximize:
xEp y → W (Ep)u(x) + (1 − W (Ep))u(y) (1)
To make (1) operational we use the two-stage model idea proposed by Tversky
and Fox (1995) and later developed into the ‘source method’ by Abdellaoui et al.
(2011a, b). According to this model a decision maker first forms a subjective belief
for an uncertain event (P(Ep)) and then transforms this value into willingness to bet
via a probability weighting function:
W (Ep) = wσ (P(Ep)) (2)
In (2), wσ (·) is the probability weighting function which depends on σ , the source
of uncertainty. Applying (2) to (1) we get:
xEp y → wσ (P(Ep))u(x) + (1 − wσ (P(Ep)))u(y) (3)
We can break down (3) into: (1) utility over monetary outcomes, u(·), (2) proba-
bility measure over outcome distribution, P(·) and (3) source-dependent probability
weighting function, wσ (·). The source method adjusts this third component according
to the environment where the risky choice takes place.
In DFD we are in an environment where probabilities are completely known and so
p = Ep. When analysing DFE on the other hand, we are referring to an environment
where probabilities cannot be calculated exactly but can instead be assessed in an
empirical manner by the subject. To apply (3) in DFE, given that the belief P(Ep) is
essentially unobservable, we consider the following two proxies: Objective (or true)
probability (p) and experienced probability ( fp). The latter stands for the relative
frequency with which an event has been observed in a sample.
Using true probabilities as proxies for beliefs, although convenient and widely
used in this literature, can be problematic—especially in cases where sampling bias is
prevalent. Therefore, our analysis proceeds by reporting (mostly) experienced proba-
bilities. Although this proxy might still not be perfect, there has been evidence for a
high correlation between elicited beliefs and fp (Fox and Hadar 2006).
5 Restricting analysis to gains reduces CPT to the Rank Dependent Utility model (Quiggin 1982).
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2.2.2 Estimation
Our approach is based on AHP’s adaptation of the semi-parametric method developed
by Abdellaoui et al. (2008). We use 16 lotteries (Table 1; lotteries 1–16) which we
separate into two clusters. In the first cluster subjects evaluate 7 lotteries with a fixed
probability p = 0.25. The reported CEs are then used for the estimation of a util-
ity function. Assuming the power-function specification: u(x) = xα , we need only
estimate (W (E0.25), α) for each subject, where α captures the curvature of the utility
function and W (E0.25) the weight assigned to E0.25. We do so by minimizing the
non-linear least square function: ‖z − zˆ‖2, where zi refers to the observed CE and zˆi :
zˆi =
[
W (E0.25)
(
xαi − yαi
) + yαi
] 1
α (4)
In the second cluster subjects evaluate a total of 9 lotteries with fixed high (x = £16)
and low (y = £0) outcomes and varying p. Subsequently, using the estimated α
from the first cluster of lotteries, we can control for risk curvature and calculate non-
parametrically decision weights6 for each level of p.
Let z′j stand for the observed CE elicited from this second cluster of lotteries. Then
from (4) we get that:
W (E p j ) =
( z′j
16
)α
, for j = 1, . . . , 9 (5)
Finally, we used these decision weights to fit the following two-parameter, linear-
in-log-odds weighting function introduced by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987).
w(p) = δp
γ
δpγ + (1 − p)γ (6)
This is the same weighting function that AHP used. Parameter γ controls curvature
with γ < 1 indicating an inverse S-shaped weighting function while γ > 1 a S-shaped
one (values close to 1 point to no curvature). Parameter δ controls elevation with δ < 1,
δ > 1 and δ = 1 pointing to ‘low’, ‘high’ and ‘no’ elevation, respectively. Gonzalez and
Wu (1999) an interesting psychophysical interpretation for these parameters according
to which γ is interpreted as a measure of probabilistic sophistication while δ as a degree
of optimism.
3 Results
3.1 Sampling
We start by comparing sampling patterns between the two DFE treatments. Figure 3
foreshadows the importance of the history table in influencing subjects’ search.
6 Similarly to AHP, decision weights based on Ep for probability targets that were not represented in
subjects’ samples, were obtained by a linear interpolation of the weighting function at the individual level.
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Fig. 3 Distribution of draws across DFE-treatments. ‘Max HT’ points to the maximum capacity of the
history table (57 draws). Subjects could sample past that point but their observations would not be recorded
in the history table
In Fig. 3, sampling amounts for each subject and in each period are plotted across the
two treatments. The spike in DFE-HT occurs right when the participant has filled this
sampling-round’s history table. We infer from this that the history table’s maximum
capacity (always set at 57 draws) was a very potent cue for search termination in DFE-
HT. In its absence, participants’ search-effort followed a more normal-like distribution.
Variance and experienced variability
We first examine the effect of experienced-outcome7 variability (variability for short).
Following Lejarraga et al. (2012) we distinguish between: positive variability if some-
one sampled more than one type of cards in a deck and no variability otherwise.
Comparing the means of these two groups we verify that experiencing positive vari-
ability correlates positively with higher amounts of sampling. Specifically, sampling
amount for positive variability averaged 33.5 draws per lottery while that for no vari-
ability 19.5 (p value <0.01, two-sided MW test).
We turn next to the relation between sampling amount and a lottery’s variance where
we compute averages of sampling amount for each level of variance and examine how
the two correlate in each sampling treatment. Subjects only sampled binary lotteries
and hence variance was always strictly positive. As mentioned earlier, low variance is
associated with rare events. For example a binary lottery offering 1 with probability p
and 0 otherwise has variance: p(1 − p) which is maximized when p = 1/2, i.e. when
the rarity of the rarer event is minimized.
In both DFE treatments variance correlates negatively with search effort. Interest-
ingly, this correlation is significant in DFE-NoHT (Spearman’s ρ = −0.89, p value
= 0.03) but not in DFE-HT (ρ = −0.6, p value = 0.24). Figure 4 displays this
information.
Individual level analysis corroborates this finding. We estimate slopes for each
subject from a simple linear regression, where average sampling over all rounds is
7 In our study this phenomenon is more accurately described as experienced event variability. Outcomes
refer to monetary consequences while in our sampling stage subjects sampled events which were only later
assigned to outcomes.
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Fig. 4 Average sampling amount over levels of variance. Points represent average sampling—across all
subjects—for different levels of variance in DFE-NoHT (left panel) and DFE-HT (right panel). The solid
straight lines have been estimated by OLS at the aggregate level. Lotteries like: (x, Ep; y) and (x, E1−p; y)
are indistinguishable during sampling and were pooled together. Lotteries and hence levels of variance were
randomized for each subject and so this effect is independent of time period
regressed on levels of variance (a slope similar to the one in Fig. 4 but for each indi-
vidual). Although average slopes are negative in both treatments (DFE-NoHT: −29.61
vs. DFE-HT: −6.98), only in DFE-NoHT this coefficient is significantly smaller than 0
(p value <0.01 for DFE-NoHT and p value =0.146 for DFE-HT, one-sided MW tests).
Moreover, the slope is steeper in DFE-NoHT than in DFE-HT (p value = 0.043, one-
sided MW-test). Estimating rank correlation coefficients instead of slopes replicates
this analysis. In both treatments the average correlation is negative ( DFE-NoHT:
−0.219, DFE-HT: −0.053) but only in DFE-NoHT this coefficient is significantly
smaller than 0 (p value <0.01 for DFE-NoHT and p value = 0.259 for DFE-HT, one-
sided MW-tests). Since lotteries with rarer events are associated with lower variance,
we can state the following result:
Result 1 Decks containing rarer events instigate higher search-effort. The history
table partially mitigates this effect.
Result 1 runs opposite to Lejarraga et al.’s hypothesis that experienced variability
causes higher amount of sampling. We return to this point in the Discussion.
Time periods
Figure 5 plots average sampling amount over time. We see that in DFE-NoHT there
is a clear negative trend: subject possibly get tired of sampling over time. In DFE-HT
the pattern is inverted U-shaped. It is possible that subjects realize the benefits of
the history table after the end of the first sampling round and adjust their strategy to
collecting larger samples. After this original upwards-adjustment, sampling amount
stabilizes at a high level until it eventually decays in the last periods.
We detect a significant negative time trend in search effort in DFE-NoHT (ρ =
−0.78; p value <0.01). We found no significant such trend in DFE-HT (ρ = −0.13,
123
O. Kopsacheilis
Fig. 5 Average sampling amount over periods. Points represent average sampling—across all subjects—
for different time-periods in DFE-NoHT (left panel) and DFE-HT (right panel). Arguably the OLS at the
aggregate level that is used to plot the solid straight lines is not informative for the DFE-HT treatment
where the shape is inverted U
p value = 0.66). This is most likely due to the fact that with the exception of the
first and last periods, sampling amount remained relatively unaffected by time in
DFE-HT. Comparing the variances of average sampling amounts from periods 2 to
12, we find that the variance in DFE-HT (1.81) is smaller than the one in DFE-
NoHT (6.97). Levene’s test for variance equality shows that the two variances are
significantly different (p value = 0.028). When we look only at the second half of
the time periods, we verify that eventually time affected subjects in DFE-HT too
(Spearman’s ρ = −0.90 , p value <0.01). In summary:
Result 2 Sampling amount diminishes over time. This effect is less prominent in DFE-
HT.
Slope and rank correlation analysis at the individual level verify this result. For
brevity we report only rank correlation coefficients. For DFE-NoHT this coefficient
was on average significantly smaller than 0 (ρ = −0.14, p value = 0.033, one-
sided MW-test) and significantly smaller than the average for DFE-HT (p value =
0.033, one-sided MW-test). The average rank correlation coefficient for DFE-HT is
not significantly different than 0 (ρ = 0.04, p value = 0.492) but once again, when
we focus on the second half of the periods, it becomes significantly (albeit weakly)
negative (ρ = −0.127, p value = 0.051, one-sided MW-test).
Memory
We examine whether the history table boosted search effort across the two treatments.
First, we find that the median sampling amount across both treatments was 30, which
is unusually high. This number was 7 ± 2 in most studies in the sampling paradigm
(Hertwig and Pleskac 2010) and between 15 and 21 in AHP. Consequently, in the
current study subjects did not sample both types of cards in only 10% of the cases
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(9% in DFE-HT, 11% in DFE-NoHT). In Hertwig et al. (2004) that number is 44%.
Nevertheless, sampling levels were not significantly different between the two DFE
treatments. The median number of draws for DFE-HT was 30 while that for DFE-
NoHT was 28 (p value = 0.158, two-sided MW-test). Moreover, the forward digit
span task, which served as our proxy for working memory, did not correlate with
sampling amount in either treatment (ρ = 0.13, p value = 0.41 and ρ = 0.22, p value
= 0.15 for DFE-NoHT and DFE-HT respectively).
3.2 Choices and preferences
3.2.1 The DE gap in choice
In this section, we examine the DE gap in choice over lotteries without the mediation
of a preference model. We first look at the choice patterns reported by two important
early studies in this literature: Hertwig et al. (2004) and Hau et al. (2008). These studies
share a common set of decision problems where a subject is asked to choose between
two options with similar EV but differing variance. We refer to the high variance option
as ‘Risky’ and the low variance option as ‘Safe’. To increase comparability with our
study we consider only those decision problems that entail non-negative outcomes and
where the ‘Safe’ option is a certain outcome (see Appendix/Table 6 for the full list of
decision problems). This restricts the analysis to 2 decision problems (from a total of
6) which we then characterize according to the desirability of the rare outcome of the
‘Risky’ option. Decision problems with a rare (un)desirable outcome are referred to
as ‘(un)desirable rare’. Let ‘%R’ stand for the percentage with which subjects chose
‘Risky’ over ‘Safe’. Figure 6 plots %R across treatments in these two studies for
‘desirable rare’ and ‘undesirable rare’.
Table 2 lists the properties of the early DE gap according to the observed choice-
patterns. Properties 1 and 2 derive from comparisons between DFD and DFE while
Fig. 6 Choice patterns in early DE gap studies. Percentage choosing ‘Risky’ over ‘Safe’ across studies (a,
b), treatments (DFD and DFE) and decision problems (‘desirable rare’ and ‘undesirable rare’). a Hertwig
et al. (2004) b Hau et al. (2008)/Study 1. Desirable rare/Risky = (32, E0.1; 0) vs. Safe = (3, E1.0).
Undesirable rare: Risky = (4, E0.8; 0) vs. Safe = (3, E1.0)
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Table 2 Properties of the
original DE gap in choice Property # Choice pattern Condition
1. %RDFD > %RDFE Desirable rare
2. %RDFD < %RDFE Undesirable rare
3. %RDesirable > %RUndesirable DFD
4. %RDesirable < %RUndesirable DFE
Fig. 7 Choice patterns in this study. Percentage choosing ‘Risky’ (%R) over ‘Safe’ in the current study
across treatments (DFD, DFE-HT and DFE-NoHT) and types of decision problems (desirable and undesir-
able rare). ‘Risky’ refers always to the lottery and ‘Safe’ to its expected value. We consider lotteries 8–16
from Table 1 and cluster choices in the following way: ‘Desirable rare’: Risky = (16, Ep; 0) for p ≤ 0.25.
‘Undesirable rare’: Risky = (16, Ep; 0) for p ≥ 0.75. ns not significant, ***p value < 0.01, **p value <
0.05
Properties 3 and 4 from comparisons within each treatment. Property 1 is that people
choose ‘Risky’ over ‘Safe’ more often in DFD than in DFE when the rare outcome
is desirable while Property 2 is that the opposite holds true when the rare outcome is
undesirable instead. Property 3 is that subjects in DFD choose ‘Risky’ over ‘Safe’ more
often when the rare outcome is undesirable than when it is desirable while Property 4
is that this pattern is reversed when subjects make decisions in DFE.
Figure 7 plots results from our study using an analysis similar to that summarized in
Fig. 6. Recall that although our method relies on lottery-valuations, these valuations
take place via repeated choices. For this analysis we use lotteries 8–16 from Table
1). These are the same lotteries which we later use to elicit weighting functions and
therefore appropriate to compare the two types of DE gap: that inferred by choice-
patterns (sampling paradigm) and that inferred by weighting patterns (AHP). We
separate these lotteries into two clusters: those with p ≤ 0.25 and those with p ≥ 0.75.
Decision problems entailing a choice between a lottery with p ≤ 0.25 and its EV
are characterised as ‘desirable rare’ since the rare8 event is associated with the high
outcome (£16). Decision problems entailing a choice between a lottery with p ≥ 0.25
and its EV are characterised as ‘undesirable rare’ since the rare event is associated
with the low outcome (£0). This analysis leaves out only the lottery with the 50–50
distribution where no event can be considered to be rarer than the other.
According to Fig. 7, choice patterns in DFD are significantly different than in DFE-
HT and DFE-NoHT for ‘desirable rare’ (p value <0.01 for both DFD vs. DFE-HT and
8 We replicate our results when considering stricter thresholds for rare events such as p < 0.25 or p < 0.10.
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DFD vs. DFE-NoHT, two-sided proportion test). For the ‘undesirable rare’, however,
only the DFD vs. DFE-NoHT comparison is significant (p value = 0.037 for DFD vs.
DFE-NoHT and p value = 0.384 for DFD vs. DFE-HT, two-sided proportion test).
Result 3 summarizes this analysis.
Result 3 Both versions of DFE generate a significant DE gap. This gap is smaller in
the presence of the history table.
Moreover, comparing the choice patterns in Fig. 7 with Table 2 we verify that 3
out of these 4 properties of the early DE gap hold in this analysis. However, the fact
that %R in DFE is higher in the ‘desirable rare’ than in the ‘undesirable rare’ violates
Property 4. With this in mind, we claim that:
Result 4 The DE gap we capture in this study is qualitatively similar but not identical
to the original phenomenon.
We examine two hypotheses for the low level of %RUndesirable in DFE. First, we
consider the possibility that this is due to the asymmetry in the EV of the risky option
between early DE gap studies (3.2) and the current one (14.3 on average). Second,
we conjecture that the difference is driven by information-asymmetries between the
two paradigms: unlike the sampling paradigm, subjects in our study were always
informed about the existence of the second outcome. Moreover, due to the higher
levels of sampling we recorded, rare events were under-represented less often than in
earlier studies.
With respect to the first hypothesis, we examine choices from control lottery:
(4, E0.8; 0) and observe that the pattern is very similar to that in Fig. 7 (%RDFD =
26%, %RDFE−HT = 30%, %RDFE−NoHT = 31%; see Appendix/Table7 for details on
the choice patterns of all ‘control’ lotteries). For the second hypothesis we repeated the
analysis in Fig. 7 but considering only cases in which the probability of the rare event
has been under-represented. We see that in this case all 4 properties of the early DE gap
hold for the comparison between DFD and DFE-NoHT (but still not for that between
DFD and DFE-HT; see Appendix/Fig. 10) and, therefore, conclude that the second
hypothesis is more likely to be the explanation behind the violation of Property 4.
One last thing to notice about Fig. 7 is that risk aversion (as inferred by %R) is
probability dependent. In DFD subjects seem to be overall risk seeking (%R > 50%)
for small gain probabilities (i.e. when the rare event is desirable) but risk averse
(%R < 50%) for high gain probabilities (i.e. when the rare event is undesirable). This
is in accord with CPT’s fourfold pattern. In DFE, subjects seem to be overall risk
neutral (%R  50%) for small gain probabilities but risk averse (albeit comparatively
less so than in DFD) for high gain probabilities.
3.2.2 The DE gap in preferences
We proceed by incorporating in the analysis all iterations of the bisection and extract-
ing a CE for each lottery. We use these CEs to estimate CPT’s components as described
under Sect. 2.2.2. We start by comparing utility curvature (α) across treatments.
Median values in all treatments suggest a near linear utility curvature (Table 3). These
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Table 3 Median estimates of (α, δ, γ )
Treatment Utility curvature (α) Weighting elevation (δ) Weighting curvature (γ )
DFD 1.06 (0.37) 0.53 (0.13) 0.49 (0.12)
DFE-HT 1.06 (0.35) 0.48 (0.10) 0.52 (0.07)
DFE-NoHT 1.02 (0.35) 0.44 (0.11) 0.67 (0.08)
For DFE treatments, the δ’s and γ ’s are estimated according to experienced probabilities. Median standard
errors from the estimation procedure are reported in parentheses. Overall, parameters were equally dispersed
across treatments; equality of variance was never rejected (p value = 0.199 for α, 0.722 for γ and 0.804
for δ, Levene’s tests). Interquartile ranges were: [0.83–1.49] for α, [0.20–0.91] for δ and [0.37–0.87] for γ
values are higher than those reported by AHP (α = 0.79 for DFD and α = 0.82 for
DFE) as well as than the usual values reported by studies with medium to low awards
(slightly less than 1; see Booij et al. 2010). They are nevertheless within the typically
reported range (see Murad et al. 2015; Epper et al. 2011 for values of α slightly higher
than 1). By classifying subjects according to utility curvature (α < 0.9 as concave,
α ∈ [0.9, 1.1] as linear and α > 1.1 as convex), we see that overall most of the sub-
jects (57%) are best characterized by a utility function that is either concave or linear
rather than convex (see Appendix/Table 8 for more details). There were no significant
differences between α’s across treatments (p value = 0.77, Kruskal–Wallis).
Having estimated α, we can use Eq. 5 to calculate decision weights for each indi-
vidual. Treatment-level weighting functions can be obtained either by aggregating
weights across subjects for each level of probability (non-parametric analysis) or by
fitting the parameters from Eq. 6 for each subject and aggregating (γ, δ) across all
subjects (parametric-analysis).9 We begin with the latter.
Parametric analysis
Kruskal–Wallis tests detect significant differences between γ -values across the three
treatments (p value = 0.038) but not for δ-values (p value = 0.501). Focusing on
γ ’s, the difference between γDFD and γNoHT is significant (p value = 0.015, two-sided
MW-test) while that between γDFD and γHT only weakly so (p value = 0.065, two-sided
MW-test). Moreover, the hypothesis that γNoHT = γHT cannot be rejected ( p value =
0.485, two-sided MW test).
Figure 8 plots differences in weighting between description and the two versions of
experience: with (left panel) and without (right panel) a history table. The proximity
between the experienced-based parameter estimates (solid lines) and objective-based
such estimates (dashed lines), holds testament to the high amount of sampling which
brought experienced and objective probabilities very close. In fact, with the exception
of p = 0.975 for DFE-HT, we were never able to reject the hypothesis that fp = p
(see Appendix/Table 5 for details). A corollary to this is that the role of sampling bias
was—at least at the aggregate level—quite limited.
Unlike what the ‘underweighting hypothesis’ would have predicted, Fig. 8 suggests
that the common inverse S-shaped weighting function accommodates well DFD as
9 See Appendix 6.3 for a demonstration of this process at the individual level.
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Fig. 8 Comparison of parametric weighting functions between DFE and DFD. For DFE, dashed lines are
estimated according to true probabilities (p) while solid lines are based on experienced probabilities ( fp)
well as both DFE treatments. Moreover, the relation between wDFD and both versions
of wDFE provides little support for the ‘ambiguity aversion hypothesis’ according to
which wDFE should lie beneath wDFD throughout the probability interval. Although
this is true for small to medium values of p, the pattern reverses for high values of
p (this is arguably clearer in the case of DFE-NoHT where the turning point occurs
somewhere in p ∈ [0.6, 0.8]). Keeping in mind that rare events are located near the
edges of the probability interval (desirable rare events close to p = 0 and undesirable
rare events close to p = 1), we can summarize Fig. 8’s pattern as follows:
Result 5 The ‘relative underweighting hypothesis’: Subjects overweight rare events
in DFD and in DFE; this overweighting is less pronounced in DFE.
At the individual level, we categorize the curvature of weighting functions as
‘inverse-S’ when γ < 0.9, as ‘S-shaped’ when γ > 1.1 and as ‘no curvature’ when
γ ∈ [0.9, 1.1]. There are approximately twice as many subjects compatible with an
‘S-shaped’ weighting function in DFE (DFE-HT: 10 subjects, DFE-NoHT: 9 subjects)
as in DFD (5 subjects). Interestingly, most of these S-shaped curves stem from sub-
jects who sampled less than the median amount of that treatment: 60% in DFE-HT
and 89% in DFE-NoHT (see more details of this classification in Appendix/Table 8).
A rank correlation test between sampling behaviour (1 if someone sampled less or
equal to the median amount and 0 if more) and curvature of the weighting function
(1 if γ > 1.1 and 0 otherwise) verifies that there is a significant correlation between
the two (ρ = 0.318, p value<0.01).10 No such correlation was detected for similar
classifications of δ (ρ = −0.038, p value = 0.736).
10 This result is robust for different classifications of S-shaped curves such as with γ > 1. We used
γ ’s based on decision weights from objective probabilities. The reason we did not use weights corrected
for fp was so that we capture the effect of mis-representing objective probabilities (p) in low sampling
cases. When we perform the same analysis adjusted for fp we find that the correlation is reduced but still
significant (ρ = 0.245, p value = 0.029).
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Table 4 Non-parametric decision weights (averages)
Probability DFD DFE-HT DFE-NoHT DFD vs. p DFE-HT vs. p DFE-NoHT vs. p
p wDFD wHT wNoHT t39 t40 t39
0.025 0.16 0.11 0.09 4.58∗∗∗ 2.38∗∗ 2.35∗∗
0.05 0.18 0.16 0.12 4.24∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗
0.10 0.20 0.18 0.15 3.23∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗ 2.12∗∗
0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21 −0.09ns −1.43ns 1.44ns
0.50 0.36 0.30 0.31 −3.64∗∗∗ −5.52∗∗∗ −5.52∗∗∗
0.75 0.49 0.47 0.49 −6.41∗∗∗ −6.31∗∗∗ −6.31∗∗∗
0.90 0.63 0.65 0.65 −5.48∗∗∗ −5.20∗∗∗ −5.19∗∗∗
0.95 0.60 0.69 0.69 −7.11∗∗∗ −5.07∗∗∗ −5.02∗∗∗
0.975 0.71 0.72 0.74 −5.43∗∗∗ −4.07∗∗∗ −4.07∗∗∗
Columns 2–4: average decision weights for each level of probability (p). For brevity, only weights that have
been estimated according to experienced probabilities ( fp) are reported.
Columns 5–7: two-sided t-statistics for the comparison with the identity line. With the exception of p = 0.25,
low probabilities are significantly overweighted (see ‘+’ sign on t-statistic) and medium to high probabilities
significantly underweighted (see ‘−’ sign on t-statistic). Two sided MW-tests confirm this analysis
ns not significant
∗∗∗ p value < 0.01
∗∗ p value < 0.05
Result 6 S-shaped weighting curves are more common to subjects who sample less.
Result 6 may be very useful in explaining why we find so little support of the
‘underweighting hypothesis’; we return to this point in the discussion section.
Non-parametric analysis
Table 4 reports average decision weights—computed according to experienced prob-
abilities ( fp)—across individuals according to probability level and treatment.11
Qualitatively the non-parametric analysis corroborates Result 5: aggregate deci-
sion weights point to inverse S-shaped weighting functions in all treatments with
a cross-over point in the vicinity of p = 0.25. This is supported by statistical anal-
ysis comparing decision weights with the diagonal (see last three columns of Table
4). Moreover, this overweighting appears to be partially mitigated for rare events:
wDFE < wDFD for p < 0.25 and (1 − wDFE) < (1 − wDFD) for p > 0.75. Statistical
analysis, however, warrants a note of caution regarding the last assertion. A 3 × 9
ANOVA does not detect any significant differences between the 3 treatments (p value
= 0.412).12
11 See Appendix/Table 9 for a comparison of the median decision weights between this study and AHP)
12 Similarly, conducting two-sided MW-tests with Bonferroni corrections, we can never reject the hypoth-
esis that decision weights are equal between DFD and DFE-HT nor between DFD and DFE-NoHT for any
level of p.
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3.2.3 Recency effects
We explore whether events experienced towards the end of the sampling process
influenced choices more than events that were sampled in the beginning. To this end
we folow AHP’s approach13 and compare absolute differences between revealed and
experienced probabilities as inferred from the first and second halves of each sampling
round. Revealed probabilities are estimates of P(Ep), the likelihood assigned by the
subject to event Ep (see expression (2) in Sect. 2.2.1). These estimates derive from
the estimated inverse images: w−1σ [wσ ( fp)]. Had recency effects been present, we
would expect the fp of the second half of the sampling process to be closer to P(Ep)
estimates. Notwithstanding, a 2 × 9 ANOVA with repeated measures for the first and
second half did not detect significant asymmetries between the early and the later
observations of the sampling process (p value = 0.73 for DFE-NoHT and 0.64 for
DFE-HT).14 We thus conclude that there were no recency effects.
4 Discussion
Variance vs. variability
We began by exploring the effect on sampling amount of two related concepts, experi-
enced event variability and a lottery’s variance. We verify that experienced variability
correlates with higher levels of sampling. Does that mean, however, that experiencing
variability causes subjects to sample more as Lejarraga et al. (2012) have claimed? Or
is it rather that high levels of sampling lead subjects to sample more than one event?
To clarify the direction of causality we examined the role of variance which is a proxy
for experienced variability: lotteries with higher variance are more likely to generate
experienced variability. At the same time, unlike experienced variability, variance is a
structural property of the lottery and thus cannot be affected by the amount of sampling.
In our setting, low variance is associated with rarer events. Therefore, if experienced
variability causes higher levels of sampling, we would expect high-variance lotteries
to be associated with higher levels of sampling. Instead, Fig. 4 and Result 1 point to
the opposite: subjects sample more from lotteries with low variance, or equivalently,
lotteries containing rarer events. According to a property of the binomial distribution,
rare events tend to be revealed later on during search. Consequently, Result 1 has more
in common with Mehlhorn et al.’s (2014) suggestion that it is anticipated rather than
experienced variability that instigates higher levels of sampling.
Does the history table crowd out attention from the sampling process?
As Result 1 suggests, the increased sensitivity towards rare events was attenuated in the
anticipation of the history table. Result 2, highlights another such search-policy rigidity
in DFE-HT. Unlike the clear negative time-trend in DFE-NoHT, average sampling in
DFE-HT has a significantly less steep decline. In fact, excluding first and last periods,
13 See AHP pp. 1890 for more details on this method.
14 Conducting two-sided MW-tests for each level of p with Bonferroni corrections corroborate this.
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average sampling remained relatively stable in DFE-HT (we observed significantly
lower variance of average sampling compared to DFE-NoHT during these periods).
One possible overarching explanation for these findings is that the anticipation of the
history table makes cues unrelated to it less salient. Figure 3 can perhaps be interpreted
along these lines. The frequency with which subjects in DFE-HT chose to collect a
sample just equal to the table’s maximum capacity, corroborates the hypothesis that
cues such as time and variance were overriden by that of filling up the history table.
Memory limits
Taking into account their elusive nature we chose to approach the potential effects of
memory bounds from three different angles. First, we asked whether alleviating the
cognitive load of memorizing via the history table can boost search effort. Second, we
examined whether individual idiosyncratic memory capacity correlates with the size
of drawn samples. Finally, we examined whether later observations exert more influ-
ence on final decisions when compared to earlier ones. Despite this multidimensional
approach we were unable to detect a clear effect in all three accounts. Subjects’ sample
size did not vary significantly between DFE-HT and DFE-NoHT nor did it correlate
with the forward digit span task. Finally, we find no evidence for recency effects.
Given the intuitive appeal of the role of memory bounds this absence of effects may
seem counter-intuitive. This impression is only strengthened by the fact that in our
study samples were unusually high, which should have amplified the impact of the
role of memory. However, these results add to an increasing amount of evidence that
challenges the importance of memory bounds (e.g. Rakow et al. 2008; Wulff et al. 2016
for a relevant discussion). To this end, we welcome studies that seek to understand
how decisions are informed by exploring mechanisms beyond plain memorisation.
Why so much sampling?
Subjects in both versions of our DFE treatments were much more eager to explore
options than what has commonly been reported. One explanation for this search ‘explo-
sion’ relates to the absence of waiting time between two consecutive draws. In our
experiment subjects were able to regulate the time the card remains on their screen.
On the one hand, this feature increased clicking effort as subjects had to click twice—
instead of only once which is more typical—before observing a new card: first to
replace the previously drawn card and then to sample a new one. On the other hand,
this adaptation made subjects’ role during exploration more active as well as made
the sampling process quicker—should subjects choose to click fast enough. It has
been argued that in DFE, subjects are the ‘masters of their information search’ (Hills
and Hertwig 2010) and in this sense this study’s framework takes this exploration-
ownership one step further. Perhaps the more subjects relate to the role of an actor
instead of that of an observer, the more encouraged they feel to explore further. A
more prosaic explanation would be that the cost of clicking twice is a small price to
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pay for removing waiting time and, therefore, our intervention simply reduced the
opportunity cost of sampling.
The DE gap across different elicitation methods
The differences between AHP’s methodology (which this study adopts) with that
of the sampling paradigm in inferring a DE gap, have raised concerns regarding the
compatibility of the findings within these two approaches. Results 3 and 4 are reas-
suring in that respect. Result 3 shows that our method can detect a significant DE
gap even without the mediation of a preference model, by focusing only on choice
patterns. These choices are elicited from the first iteration of the bisection method
which entails a choice between a risky and a safe option of equal EV; a setting very
similar to that in early DE gap studies. Moreover, according to Result 4, this DE gap
is qualitatively similar to that elicited in the sampling paradigm. Just as in Hertwig
et al. (2004), subjects in our study chose the risky option more frequently in DFD than
in DFE when rare events were associated with desirable outcomes while the opposite
was true when the outcomes were undesirable. However, unlike in the early DE gap
studies, subjects in our DFE treatments were overly hesitant in choosing ‘Risky’ in
‘undesirable rare’ decision problems. We discuss two possible explanations for this.
First, the fact that subjects knew about the existence of the (rare) undesirable out-
come might have contributed to their hesitation of choosing ‘Risky’. This is in accord
with the ‘mere presentation effect’ discussed in Erev et al. (2008). Unlike the sampling
paradigm where if this outcome was never sampled subjects might had never inferred
its existence, AHP’s method requires that subjects eventually found out about this out-
come. Moreover, the fact that subjects in our study sampled a lot and were overall very
well informed about the likelihood of the undesirable outcome might have amplified
this effect. Indeed, when we look only in samples where this probability was under-
represented we see that subjects become more willing to take the risky option in such
‘undesirable rare’ decision problems. Second, we consider the discrepancy between
the EV of lotteries under consideration. In earlier studies, subjects typically faced lot-
teries with an EV of approximately £3 (or less). In our study that EV was somewhere
between £12 and £15.6 which could have made subjects more hesitant to reject the safe
option. Given, however, that our analysis of the control lottery: (4, E0.8; 0) replicated
this unusually high hesitation we believe that our first hypothesis is more likely to be
the case.
The relative underweighting hypothesis
Our elicited weighting patterns provided little support for both the ‘underweighting’
and the ‘ambiguity aversion’ hypotheses. With respect to the first, our data in all
treatments reveal—at the aggregate level—an inverse S-shaped weighting function
which prescribes overweighting instead of underweighting of rare events. Moreover,
unlike the second hypothesis, DFE-elicited weighting curves do not lie entirely beneath
that elicited in DFD. Instead, our pattern seems to fit best under a third hypothesis
that can be interpreted as a modest version of the underweighting one. The ‘relative
underweighting hypothesis’ as summarized by Result 5 posits that although subjects
overweight rare events in DFE, they do it less so than in DFD.
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Regarding the discord with the ‘underweighting hypothesis’, Result 5 is not entirely
surprising. Over the last few years, an increasing amount of studies have also failed to
detect a S-shaped weighting curve, irrespective of the elicitation method they followed
(e.g. AHP, Aydogan and Gao 2016; Glöckner et al. 2016). One possible explanation for
the absence of a S-shaped pattern in our DFE treatments is related to the high levels of
sampling amount we recorded. Indeed, Result 6 seems to point in that direction as S-
shaped weighting functions are prevalent among subjects who sample less. This is not
surprising: subjects who do not sample enough are more likely to under-represent, and
thus underweight rare events. It is, therefore, plausible that if our levels of sampling had
been significantly lower, we might have seen more evidence for the ‘underweighting
hypothesis’.
With respect to the disagreement with the ‘ambiguity aversion hypothesis’ we
suggest the following explanation. The fact that subjects in our study collected larger
samples than those in AHP might have affected their confidence during the evaluation
of the lotteries. It is true that subjects in DFE can never be entirely certain regarding
the underlying probability distribution. Nevertheless, richer information sets—such
as the ones collected in our study—could have increased their confidence about those
likelihoods and consequently reduced the associated ambiguity aversion.
Does the history table bridge the DE gap?
Lastly, we turn to a comparison of the DE gap between the two versions of experience
that caused it. Result 3 suggests that although the gap is significant in both cases,
its size is not symmetric. Specifically, our choice patterns reveal a bigger DE gap
between DFD and DFE-NoHT. This asymmetry is corroborated by the weighting
function comparison −wDFD and wHT are ‘closer’ than wDFD and wNoHT—as well as
by the resistance of DFE-HT to ‘conform’ to all 4 properties of the original DE gap,
even when we focus on under-represented probabilities.
To the extent that the analogical display of previously sampled events in DFE-HT
has a similar ‘descriptive’ effect to the numerical summaries of uncertainty in DFD,
this result should not come as a surprise. We interpret this ‘bridging’ of the gap as
evidence that the DE gap should not be seen as a dichotomy but rather as a continuum
over different levels of uncertainty.
5 Conclusion
We conduct a lab-experiment and examine how people search for information about
uncertainty and how this search influences their ensuing risky choices. We find that
besides the properties of the risky options at hand, the environment in which these
options are presented and evaluated is also important. With respect to search patterns in
DFE, we show that a lottery’s variance is negatively correlated with sampling amount
which in this context means that people sample more from options with rarer events.
We also find that sampling amount decreases over time periods. Both of these findings
become less salient after the introduction of a history table which records and displays
previously sampled outcomes at the time of the lottery evaluation. The cue that stands
out in that case is the maximum capacity of that table. Moreover, our examination of
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the role of memory in sampling suggests that memory bounds were not very influential
on search policies.
With respect to choices and preferences we compare responses between two varia-
tions of DFE: with (DFE-HT) and without a history table (DFE-NoHT) and compare
them with those elicited from a standard version of DFD. Both of these comparisons
generate a significant DE gap which is mitigated, however, by the inclusion of the
history table. We interpret these choices through the CPT preference model by elicit-
ing risk curvature (parametrically) and weighting functions (both parametrically and
non-parametrically) at the individual level. Although utility curvature does not differ
across treatments, the shape of decision weighting functions does. In our version of
the DE gap in weighting, subjects in DFE overweight rare events but less so than in
DFD. We show that the absence of under-weighting in DFE can partially be explained
by the unusually high levels of sampling observed in our study.
Finally, we report a measure that allows us to compare the type of gap found in
studies using valuation methods—like this one—with the type of gap elicited in studies
that use choice methods. We show that the phenomenon is qualitatively similar but
not identical between the two methods.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Screen for DFD
See Fig. 9.
Fig. 9 Instance from DFD’s information-evaluation stage. Information about the deck and lottery evaluation
take place in the same screen in DFD
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6.2 Choice patterns
See Fig. 10 and Tables 5, 6, 7.
Fig. 10 Choice patterns in cases where rare events have been under-represented. ***p value <0.01, *p
value <0.10
Table 5 Median experienced
probabilities for DFE-HT and
DFE-NoHT
p Ep
DFE-HT DFE-NoHT
0.025 0.030 0.025
0.050 0.069 0.052
0.100 0.089 0.103
0.250 0.231 0.230
0.500 0.521 0.504
0.750 0.753 0.752
0.900 0.915 0.889
0.950 0.951 0.947
0.975 0.983 0.977
With the exception of p = 0.975
for DFE-HT (p value <0.01,
two-sided MW-test), we are
never able to reject the
hypothesis that p = Ep
Table 6 Decision set from
Hertwig et al. (2004) Decision Lotteries
problem Risky Safe
1 (4, E0.8; 0) (3, E1.0)
2 (4, E0.2; 0) (3, E0.25; 0)
3 (−32, E0.1; 0) (−3, E1.0)
4 (−4, E0.8; 0) (−3, E1.0)
5 (32, E0.1; 0) (3, E1.0)
6 (32, E0.025; 0) (3, E0.25; 0)
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Table 7 Choice patterns in ‘control’ lotteries
Decision Lotteries %R
problem Risky Safe DFD (%) DFE-HT (%) DFE-NoHT (%)
A (4, E0.8; 0) (3.2, E1.0) 26 30 31
B (4, E0.2; 0) (0.8, E1.0) 69 73 53
C (3, E0.25; 0) (0.75, E1.0) 67 65 67
Risky options in this table were included as ‘control’ tasks due to their similarity with some of the com-
monly used problems in the sampling paradigm (see Table 6). For example decision problem 2 in Table 6
corresponds to a choice between the risky option in B and the risky option in C from this table. Since these
lotteries could only be evaluated separately in this study, we can compare choice patterns only indirectly
by comparing %R across problems B and C. According to early DE gap, %R should be higher in B than
in C for DFD while the opposite must be true for DFE. This pattern is verified in the comparison between
DFD and DFE-NoHT but not between DFD and DFE-HT. Moreover, %R should be higher in DFE than in
DFD for problem A. This is indeed the case for both DFE-NoHT and DFE-HT. All of the aforementioned
differences are relatively small and not statistically significant
6.3 Individual analysis
See Fig. 11 and Table 8.
Fig. 11 Examples of decision weights elicitation. Examples of non-parametric (circles) and parametric
(curves) weighting functions. From left to right: increasing values of γ for a relatively small range of
δ-values. There are two ways of constructing an aggregate weighting function from these five examples.
The parametric approach entails aggregating across γ - and δ- values while according to the non-parametric
one, we would aggregate across the decision weights for each level of probability
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6.4 Non-parametric analysis
See Fig. 12 and Table 9.
Fig. 12 Non-parametric weighting functions in the current study and in AHP. Plotting values from Table
9. Top row current study; bottom row AHP. For DFE, dashed lines are estimated according to objective
probabilities (p) while solid lines according to experienced probabilities ( fp). Only probability targets
included in AHP are plotted. This excludes observations at p ∈ {0.025, 0.10, 0.90, 0.975} from this study
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Table 9 Median decision
weights in this study and in AHP p Current AHP
DFD DFE-HT DFE-NoHT DFD DFE
0.05 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.08
0.25 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.19
0.50 0.36 0.26 0.30 0.42 0.37
0.75 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.57
0.95 0.62 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.80
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